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Feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments are judgments of future recognizability of currently inaccessible
information. They are known to depend both on the access to partial information about a target of retrieval and
on the familiarity of the cue that is used as a memory probe. In the present study we assessed whether FOK
judgments could also be shaped by incidental environmental context in which these judgments are made. To
this end, we investigated 2 phenomena previously documented in studies on recognition memory—a context
familiarity effect and a context reinstatement effect—in the procedure used to investigate FOK judgments. In
2 experiments, we found that FOK judgments increase in the presence of a familiar environmental context.
The results of both experiments further revealed still higher FOK judgments when made in the presence of
environmental context matching the encoding context of both cue and its associated target. The effect of
context familiarity on FOK judgment was paralleled by an effect on the latencies of an unsuccessful memory
search, but the effect of context reinstatement was not. Importantly, the elevated feeling of knowing in
reinstated and familiar contexts was not accompanied by an increase in the accuracy of those judgments.
Together, these results demonstrate that metacognitive processes are shaped by the overall volume of memory
information accessed at retrieval, independently of whether this memory information is related to a cue, a
target, or a context in which remembering takes place.
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Acts of learning and remembering always take place within a
context, many aspects of which may be irrelevant or incidental to
the focal content of the episode. Whereas a major body of research
has investigated the influence of such contextual factors on the
memory processes of encoding and retrieval (e.g., Murnane,
Phelps, & Malmberg, 1999; Smith & Handy, 2014; Smith &
Manzano, 2010), considerably less has been devoted to under-
standing how context may influence other processes involved in an
individual’s evaluation, monitoring and regulation of such acts of
learning and remembering. Such processes—that is, metamemory
or more generally metacognitive processes—play a key role in
determining outcomes such as the amount of time people spend
trying to learn or retrieve information, their confidence in the
veracity of retrieved information and—the focus of our current
investigation—their belief that information that currently eludes
recollection may nonetheless be retrieved in the future.
Failed retrieval attempts such as these are a prevalent feature of
our memory in everyday life. We often fail to remember people’s
names, most of the answers to questions in TV quizzes, or authors
of papers important for our current work. These failures of mem-
ory access do not necessarily mean, however, that the relevant
information is not available in our memory. Often, the relevant
information is there but cannot be accessed with cues currently at
our disposal. Importantly, people can often discriminate between
questions for which answers are known but are temporarily inac-
cessible and questions for which answers are not known (Leonesio
& Nelson, 1990; Morson, Moulin, & Souchay, 2015). The research
on metamemory aspects of remembering has repeatedly addressed
the issue of the basis of people’s conviction that certain inacces-
sible information is stored in memory—that is, their feeling of
knowing—revealing that both the feeling of familiarity elicited by
a memory question (Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993;
Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) and any partial, incomplete, and
sometimes even incorrect information about a sought-after target
that comes to mind in the process of retrieval (Koriat, 1993, 1995)
are relevant in this respect. In the present study we investigated
whether the feeling that inaccessible information is nevertheless
available in memory is shaped also by factors that are different
from both the memory question that is asked and the partial
information associated with what is to be retrieved. Specifically,
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we investigated whether this feeling is shaped by the features of an
incidental context that accompanies memory questions.
People’s conviction that an inaccessible answer is or is not
available in memory has been studied in laboratories by eliciting
feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments. In a typical procedure, par-
ticipants study cue–target pairs of words, and they are subse-
quently given a cued-recall task. In this cued-recall task, whenever
a participant fails to retrieve a target in response to a given cue, a
question concerning the probability of subsequent recognition of
this target is posed. It is assumed that judgments provided in
response to such a question—FOK judgments—tap into partici-
pant’s conviction that the relevant target is available in memory
even though it is not currently accessible. Importantly, studies on
FOK judgments have revealed them to be related to various
decisions participants make in a memory task, such as when to
terminate memory search (Malmberg, 2008; Singer & Tiede,
2008) and whether it is worth restudying a particular target in a
preparation for subsequent tests (Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, &
Cockcroft-McKay, 2014). These findings indicate that processes
associated with FOK judgments play an important role in effective
regulation of the process of remembering.
Research on the basis of FOK judgments has focused to date on
two factors that determine participants’ predictions of future rec-
ognition. First, increasing cue familiarity leads to elevated FOK
judgments, even though by and large it does not affect the actual
probability of subsequent target recognition. In a procedure used
by Schwartz and Metcalfe (1992), the standard FOK paradigm was
supplemented with a prefamiliarization phase in which some
words subsequently used in cued recall and FOK phases as both
targets and paired cues were included among fillers in a pleasant-
ness judgment task. Whereas prefamiliarization of target words did
not affect FOK judgments in a subsequent FOK procedure, these
judgments were found to be higher in response to primed rather
than unprimed cues. These results point to a cue familiarity heu-
ristic by which familiarity of a question serves as an indicator that
an answer to this question is known. Conclusions concerning cue
familiarity as the basis of FOK are strengthened by findings from
related paradigms. For example, Reder (1987), who originally
developed the priming manipulation for the investigation of quick
assessments of knowledge that precede the actual retrieval at-
tempts, found that people are more likely to quickly infer that they
know the answer to a memory question if elements of this question
have been previously primed. Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) ex-
tended the basic logic of cue familiarity to the domain of semantic
knowledge by manipulating familiarity of the referents of general
knowledge questions. As in the case of episodic memory, partic-
ipants were more likely to provide high FOK judgments when the
terms used in a memory question were more familiar.
Second, access to partial information about a target that may
occur during an unsuccessful attempt to retrieve this target also
affects FOK judgments. Koriat (1993) asked participants to study
strings of four or five letters and then asked them both to retrieve
as many letters as they could and to provide an FOK judgment for
each string. The main conclusions were that FOK judgments were
strongly related to the number of letters participants provided for
each string and also that this relation held independently of
whether provided letters were correct or not. Other studies provide
additional evidence for the target accessibility account by demon-
strating that FOK judgments are related to retrieval of the valence
of the currently inaccessible target word (Schacter & Worling,
1985; Thomas, Bulevich, & Dubois, 2011) or other semantic
aspects of the target word such as its activity (Koriat, Levy-Sadot,
Edry, & de Marcas, 2003). Also, episodic information associated
with the target which when retrieved does not allow for answering
a specific memory question posed by the experimenter nonetheless
increases FOK judgments. Thus, when asked to provide an FOK
judgment concerning future recognizability of one source dimen-
sion for a given item, these FOK judgments are higher if infor-
mation concerning another, unrelated source dimension is success-
fully retrieved (Brewer, Marsh, Clark-Foos, & Meeks, 2010). As a
direct consequence of this sensitivity of FOK judgments to non-
criterial recollection of target features, FOK judgments are also
increased when targets are associated at encoding with more rather
than fewer individual features (Schwartz, Pillot, & Bacon, 2014).
Both the cue familiarity and accessibility accounts emphasize
the role of focal features of the memory task—that is, cues and
targets—as determinants of FOK judgments. However, a memory
task setting is never limited to the question that is asked and the
answer that is sought but rather is always immersed in what may
appear as an incidental context in the form of a particular place,
mood of the rememberer, or thoughts that accompany it. In mem-
ory research such incidental contexts are commonly operational-
ized as incidental backgrounds for focal stimuli, either in the form
of photographs (e.g., Murnane, Phelps, & Malmberg, 1999; Reder
et al., 2013) or short films (e.g., Smith & Manzano, 2010). Al-
though participants are not instructed to remember or even pay
attention to these incidental contexts, their presence at retrieval and
their relationship to contexts present at encoding have been found
to affect both responding in memory tests and the accuracy of
provided responses (see Smith & Vela, 2001, for a review). The
question addressed here is how such nonfocal and incidental
aspects of the setting which accompany encoding and retrieval
influence metamemory processes associated with FOK judgments.
Our recent studies give credence to the idea that metamemory
judgments in general may be sensitive to the manipulations of
context. Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, and Coote (2014; see also
Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Macken, 2015) investigated the ef-
fects of context on retrospective confidence judgments in a recog-
nition memory task. Participants were presented with faces paired
with individual context photographs of various landscapes, ani-
mals, buildings, and so forth. In a subsequent two-alternative
forced-choice recognition test, they were asked to discriminate
between studied and novel faces as well as to provide assessments
of confidence in the accuracy of their recognition decisions. Faces
in a memory test were presented in three different conditions. In
the reinstated context condition, test faces were accompanied by
the same context photograph with which the target face was
presented at study. In the re-paired context condition, test faces
were accompanied by a familiar context photograph that was
presented with a different face at study. In the novel context
condition, test faces were accompanied by a novel context photo-
graph that was not included in the study phase. Crucial compari-
sons in this design were informed by previous studies that used this
particular design for investigating context effects (Hockley, 2008;
Macken, 2002; Murnane et al., 1999). A comparison of novel and
re-paired context conditions reveals the influence of context fa-
miliarity on confidence judgments, whereas the comparison of
reinstated and re-paired context conditions keeps context familiar-
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ity levels unchanged and so can illuminate the role of retrieval of
item–context associations in driving confidence judgments.
The results obtained by Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, and Coote
(2014) suggest that both context familiarity and context reinstate-
ment affect retrospective confidence judgments in a number of
ways. First, confidence was greater when context was familiar (in
the re-paired context condition) rather than novel, even though
context familiarity did not in fact affect the accuracy of recognition
decisions. Second, confidence judgments were also higher when
context was reinstated rather than re-paired. This last effect was
accompanied by higher accuracy of recognition decisions in the
reinstated context condition but only when either encoding of
item–context associations was particularly strong or a recognition
test was altered to be particularly sensitive to such associations
(although see Hanczakowski et al., 2015). Together, these results
indicate that increased context familiarity and augmented retrieval
of item–context associations both translate into the type of
metamemory process associated with higher retrospective confi-
dence judgments.
The question that we investigate in the present study is whether
similar effects of context familiarity and context reinstatement
would shape prospective FOK judgments. The two factors shaping
retrospective confidence judgments in our previous investigations
into context effects seem conceptually related to factors known to
influence FOK judgments. Regarding context familiarity, it is
plausible that its role in FOK judgments would be similar to the
role of cue familiarity described by Schwartz and Metcalfe (1992;
see also Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder,
1987). In a recognition test, increasing context familiarity inflates
retrospective confidence for recognition decisions. Importantly, it
has also been shown that when cue–target pairs are studied, pre-
familiarizing the cues leads to inflated retrospective confidence
judgments in a subsequent recognition test for targets, as long as
cues are embedded in recognition trials (Chua, Hannula, & Ran-
ganath, 2012; Hanczakowski, Pasek, Zawadzka, & Mazzoni,
2013). Given the similar influence of cue and context familiarity
on confidence judgments, one can reasonably predict that context
familiarity would also influence the magnitude of FOK judgments.
However, there is an important distinction to be made between the
roles of cues and contexts in the FOK paradigm. Specifically,
participants are explicitly instructed to use cues to attempt retrieval
of associated targets and also to use them in order to predict future
recognizability of inaccessible targets. As such, focal, deliberate
processing of cues is an integral part of the task setting. By
contrast, contexts present at retrieval are incidental to the task. It
thus remains possible that by virtue of being incidental, context
would not have a similar impact on the processes underlying FOK,
in which case context familiarity should not lead to elevated FOK
judgments.
Regarding context reinstatement, tentative predictions can be
derived from general ideas outlined by Koriat (1993) in his acces-
sibility model, according to which, in the process of memory
search for a target, accessing any additional information stored in
memory elevates FOK judgments. Reinstating encoding context at
the time of the test is known to facilitate retrieval (Macken, 2002),
which suggests that context reinstatement may also boost FOK
judgments, just as it increases retrospective confidence for recog-
nition decisions (Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Coote, 2014).
However, it is important to consider different ways in which
reinstated context may impact on what is retrieved. Context at
encoding becomes associated with both cues and their respective
targets. Reinstating the same context at retrieval may thus facilitate
full memory access to targets, as has been occasionally reported
(e.g., Smith, Handy, Angello, & Manzano, 2014), but also partial
access to some features of these targets. It is well established that
access to partial information about targets not only boosts FOK
judgments but also increases their relative accuracy (Koriat, 1993;
Thomas et al., 2011). Thus, if context reinstatement were to
increase FOK judgments by facilitating partial retrieval of target
information, it should also increase the correlation between those
judgments and performance in the recognition task.
Alternatively, context reinstatement may facilitate retrieval of
associations between a particular context and the cue which was
studied in this context. Such an outcome would be akin to the role
of context reinstatement in recognition rather than cued recall. It
remains an open question whether retrieval of such cue-to-context
associations would boost FOK judgments. To the extent that
retrieval of information about a cue is functionally similar to
retrieval of noncriterial information about targets (see Brewer et
al., 2010; Hertzog, Fulton, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2014) it should
also inflate FOK judgments. Crucially, the predictive accuracy of
FOK judgments should not benefit from retrieval of additional
information about cues, since that accuracy is based on target
information. Thus, if context reinstatement increases FOK judg-
ments without affecting their accuracy, such an effect would be
attributed to the impact on FOK judgments of the retrieval of
information about the cue, as opposed to the target.
We present two experiments that aimed at assessing the role of
contextual factors in shaping FOK judgments. In Experiment 1, we
adapted the paradigm used in the investigations of context effects
in recognition memory (Murnane et al., 1999) so that it could be
used for eliciting FOK judgments. We thus had three levels of
study–test context relationship—reinstated, re-paired, and nov-
el—to assess the role of context familiarity and context reinstate-
ment in shaping prospective FOK judgments elicited after unsuc-
cessful attempts to retrieve target words. In Experiment 2, we
repeated the same design for assessing FOK judgments while
adding another experimental condition—a prefamiliarized context
condition—in which context familiarity was manipulated via a
preexposure procedure previously used in the studies on FOK
judgments (Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992; see also Reder, 1987;
Reder & Ritter, 1992).
Experiment 1
In the present experiment, the procedure used to investigate
context effects in recognition, using the reinstated, re-paired, and
novel context conditions, was adapted for use in the recall–
judgment–recognition paradigm used to investigate FOK judg-
ments. Participants studied cue–target pairs of words presented
against the background of individual context photographs. In a
subsequent cued–recall test, participants were presented with cues
and asked to retrieve associated targets and provide FOK judg-
ments for all cues for which the recall attempt was unsuccessful
(i.e., no response was provided). Cues were presented with the
reinstated, re-paired, or novel context photographs. The main
interest was in the magnitude of FOK judgments in these three
conditions. We predicted that context familiarity would affect
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FOK judgments, leading to higher judgments in the re-paired than
novel context condition. We further predicted that context rein-
statement would also affect FOK judgments, leading to higher
judgments in the reinstated than in the re-paired context condition.
The main focus of the present study is on the factors affecting
the magnitude of FOK judgments. Nevertheless, apart from that
issue, the paradigm for eliciting FOK judgments allowed us to
investigate three other theoretical problems. First, the FOK proce-
dure includes a cued-recall phase for which the cue is the same as
that used in the subsequent FOK judgment phase. Thus, the current
procedure allows for examining context effects in cued-recall
performance. Of particular interest here is the context reinstate-
ment effect, that is, the potential benefits for correct recall con-
ferred by reinstating the exact encoding context at retrieval. A
meta-analysis conducted by Smith and Vela (2001) suggested that
a small context reinstatement effect may sometimes be detected in
cued-recall performance, although this effect was not significant
for the data pooled across various studies.
Second, the procedure for eliciting FOK judgments commonly
includes a final recognition test, which allows for assessing the
accuracy of participants’ FOK judgments, that is, whether their
judgment about the success or otherwise of a subsequent retrieval
attempt turns out to be correct. We included a recognition test
phase in our procedure as well. We expected the context familiar-
ity manipulation to leave the accuracy of FOK judgments unaf-
fected as performing cued recall in the presence of familiar con-
texts should not yield any additional information diagnostic of
future recognition (see also Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). The
prediction was less clear for the manipulation of context reinstate-
ment. If context reinstatement facilitates retrieval of partial target
information, we would expect it to increase the accuracy of FOK
judgments as access to some features of the target should be
diagnostic of subsequent recognition. However, if context rein-
statement facilitates retrieval of cue-to-context associations but not
partial retrieval of the target, then the accuracy of FOK judgments
should remain unaffected by this manipulation.
Finally, one feature of FOK judgments is that their magnitude is
often related to the duration of memory search in a preceding
cued-recall task. Specifically, people are more motivated to con-
tinue memory search under conditions that are related to higher
FOK judgments. This is often assessed by looking at latencies for
unsuccessful retrieval attempts, which are longer when FOK judg-
ments are higher (e.g., Malmberg, 2008). We looked at these
latencies in the present study, expecting that any effect of context
on the magnitude of FOK judgments would be also reflected in
longer latencies to terminate an unsuccessful memory search in the
cued-recall test.
Method
Participants. Forty-two undergraduates from Cardiff Univer-
sity participated in the present experiment.
Materials and design. A cohort of 120 words of medium
frequency and concreteness was chosen from the MRC Psycho-
linguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). They were randomly paired
to create 60 cue–target pairs. An additional 300 words were chosen
to serve as foils in a recognition test. A set of 80 black-and-white
pictures of landscapes, buildings, and animals was assembled from
various Internet sources to be used as context photographs. Sixty
of these pictures were used as context photographs for cue–target
pairs presented at study, while the remaining 20 were used in the
novel context condition at test.
Three experimental conditions were created by varying context
photographs in the cued-recall and FOK judgment phases of the
procedure. An equal number of cues used to elicit target recall and
FOK judgments were presented in each of (a) the reinstated
context condition, in which context photograph was the same as
presented for this cue in the study phase, (b) the re-paired context
condition, in which context photograph was taken from a different
cue–target pair, and (c) the novel context condition, in which an
unstudied context was presented. The context conditions were
manipulated within participants and the assignment of word pairs
to conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure. The experiment consisted of three phases. In the
study phase, participants were presented with cue–target word
pairs for study. Each word pair was presented for 2.5 s with a
500-ms interstimulus interval. Words were presented in red font,
superimposed on black-and-white photographs, with cues pre-
sented at the top and targets and the bottom of the photograph.
Participants were instructed to learn pairs of words for a future
memory test. The study phase was immediately followed by a
cued-recall test in which cues were presented against the back-
ground of context photographs (at the top of the picture). Partici-
pants were asked to recall targets associated with cues by typing
them via the computer keyboard and to type in the word blank if
they were unable to recall the target word. If the word blank was
typed in, the cue and its context photograph were presented again
and the participant was asked to judge the probability (on a scale
of 0%–100%) that the target would be recognized in a subsequent
recognition test. The time to respond in cued-recall and judgment
steps of the test was not limited. The cued-recall test was imme-
diately followed by a recognition test. In each trial of a recognition
test, one of the targets was presented along with five distracter
words (a six-alternative forced-choice test, 6AFC). Cues and con-
text photographs were not presented at recognition, and the time to
respond in this test was not limited.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
Cued recall. Performance in the cued-recall phase was ana-
lyzed with a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the
proportion of correctly recalled targets as a dependent measure.
This analysis revealed a main effect of context condition, F(2,
82) ! 33.12, MSE ! .008, p " .001, #p2 ! .45. Given that we had
no clear predictions concerning context effects in cued recall, we
performed follow-up multiple comparisons with a Bonferroni-
corrected level of $ ! .017. Cued-recall performance was best in
the reinstated context condition, which was significantly better
than both the novel context condition, t(41)! 4.29, SE! .02, p"
.001, d ! 0.68, and the re-paired context condition, t(41) ! 7.96,
SE ! .02, p " .001, d ! 1.24. Perhaps more surprisingly, correct
cued-recall performance was also lower in the re-paired than in the
novel context condition, t(41) ! 3.91, SE ! .02, p " .001, d !
0.61, suggesting that presenting re-paired contexts at test interfered
with retrieval of targets associated with the cues. Indeed, a one-
way ANOVA conducted on the rate of intrusions in cued recall
revealed differences between conditions, F(1, 82) ! 19.56,
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MSE ! .01, p " .001, #p2 ! .32. Specifically, the rate of intrusions
was higher in the re-paired context condition than in the both
novel, t(41) ! 5.70, SE ! .02, p " .001, d ! 0.88 and reinstated
context conditions, t(41) ! 4.49, SE ! .02, p " .001, d ! 0.73.
The rate of intrusions did not differ between novel and reinstated
context conditions (t " 1.3, p % .22). The fact that interference was
observed in the re-paired context condition should be remembered
when interpreting the results for FOK judgments, as we discuss later.
FOK judgments. The results of main interest concern the
magnitude of FOK judgments. The means of FOK judgments
made after unsuccessful retrieval attempts were analyzed with a
one-way ANOVA, which revealed a significant main effect of
context condition, F(2, 82)! 26.52, MSE! 27.56, p" .001, #p2!
.39. Planned comparisons revealed that FOK judgments were
higher in the re-paired than in the novel context condition, t(41) !
5.80, SE! 0.86, p" .001, d! 0.87, as well as being higher in the
reinstated than in the re-paired context condition, t(41) ! 2.66,
SE ! 1.25, p ! .011, d ! 0.41. These two results are in line with
our initial predictions that both context familiarity and context
reinstatement would increase FOK judgments.
To assess whether these effects on metacognitive monitoring were
also manifested in a measure of metacognitive control, we examined
the time to end an unsuccessful memory search—that is, the latencies
for blank responses to recall cues—in all context conditions. A one-
way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of context condition on
these latencies, F(2, 82) ! 4.03, MSE ! 1.33, p ! .021, #p2 ! .09.
Planned comparisons assessed latencies as a function of context
familiarity and context reinstatement. A comparison between re-
paired and novel context condition was not significant, t(41) ! 1.91,
SE ! .25, p ! .06, d ! 0.31, but a numerical trend (which was
significant in Experiment 2) suggested longer termination latencies
for the re-paired context condition. This effect was expected inasmuch
as it parallels the predicted effect that context familiarity had on the
magnitude of FOK judgments. However, despite the effect of context
reinstatement on FOK judgments, there was no difference between
re-paired and reinstated context conditions in the duration of unsuc-
cessful retrieval attempts (t " 1).
We also assessed participants’ ability to predict future recogni-
tion by examining gamma correlations between FOK judgments
for unrecalled items and subsequent recognition performance for
the same items. Generally, gammas were low and in fact none of
them was significantly different from zero (p ! .13, p ! .99, and
p! .64, for the reinstated, re-paired, and novel context conditions,
respectively). Although previous research has generally docu-
mented positive gammas, indicating that participants are able to
predict accurately future recognition (e.g., Sacher, Landré, & Tac-
onnat, 2015; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, & Isingrini,
2007; Thomas, Bulevich, & Dubois, 2012), it is also worth noting
that gammas for newly learned episodic information are generally
on the low side, at least in comparison to those found with FOKs
for semantic information (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Schwartz &
Metcalfe, 1992). Also, the procedure of collecting FOK judgments
only for unrecalled items, although most commonly used in the
FOK literature, is bound to result in underestimation of people’s
ability to predict subsequent recognition (cf. Koriat, 1993; Reder,
1987). A one-way ANOVA failed to reveal any differences in
gammas among the three context conditions (F " 1).1 Therefore,
not only did context not affect how predictive FOKs were of
subsequent retrieval in Experiment 1, but FOKs were generally
inaccurate throughout.
Recognition. As our primary interest in the present study lies
in the processes occurring when retrieval attempts fail, we re-
stricted the analysis of recognition performance to items for which
participants responded blank in the cued-recall phase (and thus for
1 Two participants were eliminated from this analysis due to missing
cells.
Table 1
Proportions of Correctly Recalled Targets in Cued-Recall Phase, Proportions of Intrusions in
Cued Recall, Mean of FOK Judgments for Unrecalled Items, Mean Latencies to Respond Blank
in Cued Recall (in Seconds), Mean Gamma Correlations Between FOK Judgments and
Subsequent Recognition of Unrecalled Items, and Mean Hit Rates in a 6AFC Recognition for
Unrecalled Items Presented as a Function of a Context Condition in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment and
condition Reinstated context Re-paired context Novel context Prefamiliarized context
Experiment 1
Correct cued recall .18 (.02) .02 (.01) .09 (.01) —
Cued-recall intrusions .20 (.03) .31 (.03) .18 (.03) —
FOK judgments 38.7 (2.3) 35.4 (2.2) 30.5 (2.1) —
Blank latencies 6.2 (.3) 6.0 (.4) 5.5 (.04) —
FOK resolution .13 (.08) .00 (.07) .04 (.08) —
Recognition .30 (.02) .41 (.03) .35 (.03) —
Experiment 2
Correct cued recall .19 (.02) .16 (.03) .14 (.02) .16 (.02)
Cued-recall intrusions .10 (.02) .10 (.02) .09 (.02) .09 (.02)
FOK judgments 43.6 (2.2) 40.1 (2.1) 36.3 (2.2) 45.0 (2.1)
Blank latencies 6.0 (.3) 5.8 (.03) 5.3 (.3) 5.9 (.3)
FOK resolution .19 (.08) .23 (.06) .13 (.07) .18 (.07)
Recognition .44 (.03) .42 (.03) .39 (.03) .40 (.03)
Note. Standard errors are given in parentheses. FOK ! feeling of knowing; 6AFC ! six-alternative forced-
choice test.
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which FOK judgments were collected). While the recognition test
itself did not contain any context picture, a one-way ANOVA on
recognition accuracy for these items revealed a significant main
effect of the study/recall test context condition, F(2, 82) ! 7.41,
MSE ! .02, p ! .001, #p2 ! .15. Bonferroni-corrected multiple
comparisons ($ ! .017) revealed that recognition performance for
items that previously served as targets in the re-paired context
condition was better than performance for targets previously as-
signed to the reinstated context condition, t(41) ! 3.82, SE ! .03,
p" .001, d! 0.55. It also tended to be better than performance for
targets previously serving in the novel context condition, but this
difference was not statistically significant, t(41) ! 2.29, SE ! .03,
p ! .03, d ! 0.35. The latter two conditions did not differ from
each other (t " 1.7, p % .10). These recognition results are
consistent with the idea that interference was present in cued recall
for the re-paired context condition, increasing the chances that no
response would be produced on some trials for this condition even
when a target was actually encoded in memory and could be
endorsed in a recognition test.
The main result of the present experiment is that FOK judg-
ments are affected by the incidental context in which they are
made. FOK judgments were higher in the presence of a familiar
context in the re-paired context condition than in the presence of
an unfamiliar context in the novel context condition. This partic-
ular effect was reflected also in the measure of metacognitive
control as participants searched for a target for longer in the
presence of a familiar context. FOK judgments were further in-
creased when the original study context was reinstated, although in
this case no effect on the measure of metacognitive control was
observed. The results obtained here for FOK judgments parallel
those observed for retrospective confidence judgments in the study
by Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, and Coote (2014; see also Hanc-
zakowski et al., 2015), revealing that metacognitive measures are
consistently sensitive to context effects. Therefore, context influ-
ences a range of processes taking place during remembering and
learning in both retrospective evaluation of retrieved information
and prospective judgments about the memorability of currently
inaccessible information, as well as influencing the amount of time
that participants spend trying to retrieve information.
One unexpected finding in Experiment 1 concerns memory
performance in the re-paired context condition. In recognition
studies, a comparison of this condition to a novel context condition
commonly fails to reveal any differences (Hockley, 2008; Hock-
ley, Bancroft, & Bryant, 2012; Macken, 2002), and one recent
study actually revealed better recognition performance in the re-
paired context condition (Bloch & Vakil, 2016). Against this
background it is somewhat surprising that cued-recall performance
in the present experiment showed reduced performance in the
re-paired compared to the novel context condition. However, a
plausible explanation for this is that including a re-paired context
along with the cue word in a cued-recall test may lead to activation
of the target originally paired with that context, increasing memory
interference and thus lowering performance. The analysis of in-
trusion rates—which were higher in the re-paired than the other
context conditions—and subsequent recognition are consistent
with this interference account.
The crucial point about the putative interference observed in our
results is that it clouds the interpretation of the FOK pattern in this
condition. This is particularly important for the evaluation of the
context familiarity hypothesis. We have argued that a difference in
FOK judgments between re-paired and novel context conditions
would reveal the role of context familiarity in metacognitive
monitoring. However, additional interference occurring in the re-
paired context condition means that such a difference is also
predicted by the accessibility account of FOK judgments (Koriat,
1993). This model explicitly assumes that any information re-
trieved from memory, be it correct or incorrect, raises FOK judg-
ments. If retrieval interference is the reason for the lower cued-
recall performance in the re-paired context condition, then not only
is it likely to lead to more intrusions, but it may also point to the
retrieval of more partial information, albeit partial information
about the incorrect target previously associated with the re-paired
context. This in turn could lead to an increase in FOK judgments,
rather than them being increased directly by the familiar context
itself. In light of these results, an appropriate test to distinguish
between an effect due to context familiarity and one due to an
increase in partial retrieval requires a condition in which context is
familiar but not associated with any target from encoding, and
therefore cannot serve as a cue to the partial retrieval of any study
items. In Experiment 2 we included such a condition, utilizing the
context preexposure procedure similar to that which has been
previously used to investigate the role of cue familiarity in shaping
FOK judgments (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Schwartz & Metcalfe,
1992).
Experiment 2
The aim of the present experiment was threefold. First, we
wanted to replicate the main findings concerning the effects of
context on FOK judgments from Experiment 1, and thus we
included the same three context conditions—reinstated, re-paired,
and novel—in the present design. We again expected to document
higher FOK judgments in the re-paired than in the novel context
condition and still higher FOK judgments in the reinstated context
condition. A more exploratory aim was to assess whether we
would replicate the context reinstatement and interference effects
in cued-recall performance.
The second aim of the experiment was to provide an additional
test of the context familiarity hypothesis. To this end, we included
a fourth condition in the experimental design—a prefamiliarized
context condition—in which contexts were made familiar via a
preexposure (priming) procedure (Reder, 1987; Schwartz & Met-
calfe, 1992). Therefore, the study phase was preceded by a context
familiarization phase in which participants were presented with
black-and-white photographs for which they were asked to provide
pleasantness judgments. No words were superimposed on any of
the photographs in this phase. A subset of these photographs was
later used as context photographs in the cued-recall and FOK
judgment phases of the experimental procedure. We assumed that
these contexts would be familiar due to their exposure in the
familiarization phase, but given that they were never associated
with any target, there should be no additional partial retrieval of
any target for these contexts. The question of interest is whether
FOK judgments given in the presence of these prefamiliarized
contexts would be higher than FOK judgments given in the pres-
ence of novel contexts, as the context familiarity hypothesis would
predict.
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The third aim of the experiment was to provide additional
insight into the relative accuracy of FOK judgments in various
context conditions. In Experiment 1 we found that although vary-
ing context at retrieval affected the magnitude of FOK judgments,
it did not have any effect on how accurately these judgments
predicted subsequent recognition. The interpretation of this null
result is, however, clouded by the floor effect given the fact that
participants’ ability to predict subsequent recognition of unrecalled
targets was no different than chance in all conditions. In the
present experiment, we modified the recognition testing procedure
in order to increase the relative accuracy of metacognitive judg-
ments. Whereas in Experiment 1 only target words were presented
on the 6AFC test, and participants’ task was only to recognize a
target on each test trial, in Experiment 2 both cue and target were
represented in the recognition test accompanied by the same con-
text with which they appeared in the cued-recall/FOK phase. We
reasoned that participants’ ability to predict their recognition per-
formance should be better when predictions are made under more
similar conditions to those that are later used in the recognition
test. Of interest is whether context manipulations would affect the
relative accuracy of FOK judgments under these conditions.
Method
Participants. Fifty-two undergraduates participated in the
present experiment.
Materials and design. The materials were the same as in
Experiment 1, except that a novel set of 35 black-and-white
context photographs was assembled from various Internet sources.
Four conditions were used in the present study, which meant that
15 items, rather than 20 used in Experiment 1, were assigned to
each experimental condition. Five of the context photographs used
in the novel context condition of Experiment 1 were added to the
new set of 35 photographs, and were used for the preexposure
procedure in the present experiment. A random set of 15 of these
40 prefamiliarized photographs was used in cued-recall, FOK
judgment, and recognition phases to create the prefamiliarized
context condition. The prefamiliarized context condition was in-
cluded along with the reinstated, re-paired, and novel context
conditions, which were the same as in Experiment 1. The assign-
ment of word pairs to these four experimental conditions was
counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1,
except for the addition of the preexposure phase and the changes
in the recognition test. In the preexposure phase, participants were
presented with individual black-and-white photographs, and they
were asked to judge the pleasantness of each photograph on a scale
of 1–5. The time to make a pleasantness judgment was not limited.
On each trial of a recognition test, participants were presented with
one of the targets together with five distracter words. Additionally,
in the present experiment a cue for each of the targets was
presented in each recognition trial. This cue was superimposed on
the same context (reinstated, re-paired, novel, or prefamiliarized)
with which it was presented in the preceding cued-recall and FOK
judgment phases of the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
Cued recall. A one-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of
context condition on cued-recall performance, F(3, 153) ! 2.72,
MSE ! .01, p ! .046, #p2 ! .05. Given a large number of possible
comparisons with four experimental conditions, we focused here
only on the conditions included also in Experiment 1 to assess the
replicability of the context reinstatement and interference effects.
We excluded the prefamiliarized condition, as it was irrelevant for
this analysis. The Bonferroni-corrected comparisons of reinstated,
re-paired, and novel context conditions ($ ! .017) revealed only
that correct recall was higher in the reinstated than in the novel
context condition, t(51) ! 2.61, SE ! .02, p ! .012, d ! 0.35.
This result suggests that reinstating context yields benefits for
cued-recall performance, but it should be interpreted with caution,
as a comparison between reinstated and re-paired context condi-
tions, which keeps context familiarity equal and varies only cue-
to-context match, was not significant, t(51) ! 1.67, SE ! .02, p !
.10, d ! 0.22, even though it was numerically in the direction
favoring performance in the reinstated context condition. Interest-
ingly, the difference between the re-paired and novel conditions
was not significant (t " 1.3, p % .20), and performance in this
experiment was numerically higher in the re-paired context con-
dition. This comparison indicates that an unexpected effect of
interference in the re-paired context condition that we observed in
Experiment 1 was not replicated here. The lack of interference was
also visible in the analysis of intrusions, which in contrast to
Experiment 1 failed to reveal any difference between context
conditions employed in the present experiment (F " 1).
FOK judgments. The magnitude of FOK judgments given
after unsuccessful retrieval attempts was also analyzed with a
one-way ANOVA, which revealed a main effect of context con-
dition, F(3, 153) ! 13.01, MSE ! 59.98, p " .001, #p2 ! .20. We
first conducted planned comparisons to assess if the effects ob-
served in Experiment 1 were replicated here. These comparisons
revealed that FOK judgments were indeed higher in the re-paired
than in the novel context condition, t(51) ! 2.63, SE ! 1.44, p !
.011, d ! 0.36, and also that FOK judgments were higher in the
reinstated than in the re-paired context condition, t(51) ! 2.39,
SE ! 1.46, p ! .021, d ! 0.33. These two results replicate
Experiment 1. Of interest was also whether increasing context
familiarity via preexposure would increase FOK judgments. A
comparison of FOK judgments in the prefamiliarized context
condition against FOK judgments made in the presence of unfa-
miliar context in the novel context condition revealed that this was
indeed the case, t(51) ! 5.23, SE ! 1.66, p " .001, d ! 0.73.
We again assessed whether these effects on metacognitive mon-
itoring were also reflected in a measure of metacognitive control in
the form of latencies to terminate an unsuccessful memory search.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of context condition on
latencies to respond blank, F(3, 153) ! 3.50, MSE ! 1.25, p !
.017, #p2 ! .06. In Experiment 1, we found that latencies reflected
the effect of context familiarity but not context reinstatement. The
same was the case in the present experiment, as latencies were
shorter in the novel context condition compared both to latencies
in the re-paired context condition, t(51) ! 2.22, SE ! 0.21, p !
.031, d ! 0.32, and latencies in the prefamiliarized context con-
dition, t(51) ! 3.36, SE ! 0.18, p ! .001, d ! 0.48. At the same
time latencies were not significantly different between reinstated
and re-paired context conditions (t " 1).
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We also assessed participants’ ability to predict future recogni-
tion by examining gamma correlations between FOK judgments to
unrecalled items and subsequent recognition performance for the
same items. Generally, gammas were higher in the present exper-
iment than they were in Experiment 1, indicating that presenting
retrieval cues in the same form when making an FOK judgment as
is presented when performing the criterial test promotes the accu-
racy of metacognitive monitoring. In the present experiment gam-
mas were positive and significantly different from zero in three out
of four experimental conditions, the only exception being the novel
context condition (p ! .023, p " .001, p ! .099, p ! .015, for the
reinstated, re-paired, novel, and prefamiliarized context condi-
tions, respectively). The comparisons of gammas across context
conditions failed to reveal any significant differences (F " 1).2
Recognition. We again restricted the analysis of recognition
performance to items for which no response was produced in the
cued-recall phase, and thus for which FOK judgments were col-
lected. A one-way ANOVA on recognition accuracy for these
items failed to reveal any significant differences between context
conditions (F " 1). This result contrasts with the results of
Experiment 1, in which recognition performance was highest for
the re-paired context condition. The lack of this effect in the
present experiment is consistent with the cued-recall data inas-
much as it again suggests that there was no interference in the
re-paired context condition under conditions of the present exper-
iment.
Experiment 2 replicated the crucial results from Experiment 1
concerning FOK judgments which were once again elevated both
by context familiarity and context reinstatement. Additional sup-
port for the role of context familiarity in driving FOK judgments
came from the prefamiliarized context condition. In this condition,
context familiarity was increased via the preexposure manipulation
and yet the results for FOK judgments paralleled those for the
re-paired context condition in which context familiarity was in-
creased via presentation with another target at study: FOK judg-
ments for both of these conditions were higher compared to FOK
judgments given in the presence of an unfamiliar context in the
novel context condition.3 Importantly, also replicating Experiment
1, the effect of context familiarity was reflected in the measure of
metacognitive control—the duration of memory search—although
the effect of context reinstatement was not. Together, these results
demonstrate once more the sensitivity of metacognitive monitoring
and control to the environmental context in which these metacog-
nitive processes unfold.
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrated also once more that
although context shapes the magnitude of FOK judgments, it does
not affect their relative accuracy. In the present experiment, as
opposed to Experiment 1, a match in cuing conditions was pre-
served between FOK judgment and recognition phases of the
experimental procedure. This match produced a clear positive
relationship between FOK judgments and later recognition perfor-
mance, one that was absent in Experiment 1. Still, the relationship
between the contexts present at retrieval and at encoding did not
affect the relative accuracy of FOK judgments.
One effect that was clearly not replicated in the Experiment 2
was the apparent interference effect in the re-paired context con-
dition. In Experiment 1, it was reflected in the fact that the
re-paired context condition was characterized by the lowest correct
cued recall, the highest rate of cued-recall intrusions, and the
highest rate of recognition for previously unrecalled items. All of
these effects were absent in Experiment 2. Although this lack of
interference in the re-paired context condition clearly facilitates
the interpretation of one the central results of the present investi-
gation, namely the role of context familiarity in driving FOK
judgments, it remains unclear why interference was present in
Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. In the General Discussion
we return to these unexpected findings.
General Discussion
The present study looked at the effects of context on FOK
judgments. Based on our previous research, in which sensitivity of
retrospective confidence judgments to context effects was revealed
(Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Coote, 2014; Hanczakowski et al.,
2015), we predicted that metacognitive monitoring of unsuccessful
retrieval attempts may be likewise influenced by local context in
which this monitoring takes place. The results confirmed our
predictions, revealing two distinct effects that context exerts on
FOK judgments. First, FOK judgments were influenced by context
familiarity, as participants consistently offered higher predictions
of later recognition of unrecalled targets in the presence of a
familiar rather than novel context. This occurred both when con-
text familiarity accrued during the study phase (a comparison of
the re-paired and novel context conditions in Experiments 1 and 2)
and when it accrued in a separate experimental phase in which
some contexts were preexposed (a comparison of the prefamiliar-
ized and novel context conditions in Experiment 2). Second, FOK
judgments were influenced by context reinstatement as partici-
pants consistently offered higher predictions of later recognition of
unrecalled items when a cue was coupled with the same context as
at encoding rather than a familiar but switched context.
The main purpose of the present study was to elucidate the basis
of FOK judgments. The first theories of FOK judgments postulated
a specialized mechanism that provides direct access to the contents
of a memory store and which would thus allow for accurate
predictions of subsequent recognition (Hart, 1965). Such a direct-
access theory predicts that the same factors that affect memory as
assessed by cued recall or recognition would exert parallel influ-
2 Nine participants were eliminated from this analysis due to missing
cells.
3 A reader may wonder why FOK judgments for the reinstated context
condition were higher than in the re-paired context condition—a context
reinstatement effect—while a similar comparison with the prefamiliarized
context condition suggests a numerical difference in the opposite direction
(see Table 1). It is crucial to stress here that contexts in these conditions
were not equated in terms of familiarity. Contexts included at study, and
then used in the reinstated and re-paired context conditions, were presented
in the same way which was incidental to the focal task of memorizing pairs
of words. Given the same format of presentation of these contexts in these
two conditions, they are equated in terms of familiarity, facilitating the
examination of the role of encoding-retrieval context match. By contrast,
contexts subsequently used in the prefamiliarized context condition had
been presented in a very different way, as focal elements in the deep-
orienting task that is commonly used to produce strong memory traces. One
could thus plausibly argue that such prefamiliarized contexts should be
much more familiar than incidentally encoded contexts used in the rein-
stated context condition. In any case, the very different ways in which the
incidental and the prefamiliarized contexts were encountered means that
meaningful comparisons cannot be made in the way that comparisons
between reinstated and re-paired contexts can.
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ence on FOK judgments. Numerous findings from the literature on
FOK judgments refute this prediction (e.g., Metcalfe et al., 1993)
and the results of the present study join them in doing so by
revealing that context dissociates the measures of FOK and mem-
ory. More recent theories of FOK judgments stress that people use
a variety of cues present during the retrieval process to assess
whether to-be-remembered items are actually stored in memory
(Koriat, 1993; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). The present study
demonstrates that incidental contexts present at retrieval might
provide some of these cues. By revealing the context familiarity
and context reinstatement effects, the study extends the known
basis of FOK judgments.
Starting with the context familiarity effect, the present study
builds upon previous studies documenting the role of cue famil-
iarity for FOK judgments (e.g., Metcalfe et al., 1993; Koriat &
Levy-Sadot, 2001; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz &
Metcalfe, 1992) but extends them by showing that nonfocal, inci-
dental aspects of the setting may also enter in the processes giving
rise to metacognitive judgments. The role of cue familiarity in
shaping FOK judgments is perhaps less than surprising as one can
plausibly infer that familiarity with a question should be related to
familiarity with an answer to this question. After all, cues and their
targets are always studied at the same time, and thus one could
legitimately assume that good memory for a cue indicates effective
encoding of an entire pair. The legitimacy of this assumption can
be gleaned from studies on source memory in which retrieval of
various aspects of a single study word (e.g., gender of a speaker
and position on the screen) are stochastically dependent, showing
improved performance for one aspect of the word with successful
retrieval of the other aspect (e.g., Hicks & Starns, 2016). Such
stochastic dependence is easily accounted for by fluctuations of
attention during study episode, which also predicts a correlation in
memory for cues and their targets. In the FOK procedure including
cue priming (e.g., Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) participants are
effectively misled as increased cue familiarity no longer reflects
successful encoding at study and thus it does not need to relate to
increased probability of successful encoding of a target associated
with this particular cue.
By contrast, good memory for context is a generally much less
obvious indicator of good memory for a target tested in this
context. Context is by definition incidental to the tested target and
thus, in contrast to a cue, may or may not be related to the context
that was present at encoding of this target. Indeed, in our Exper-
iment 1, only a third of retrieval contexts matched encoding
contexts and this ratio was lowered to a quarter in Experiment 2.
If targets were not studied in particular retrieval contexts, as in all
context conditions except for the reinstated context condition, then
obviously familiarity of these contexts has no bearing on how well
a to-be-remembered target was encoded. A question thus arises
why participants are still willing to base their FOK judgments on
context familiarity. One possibility is that they do not realize that
not every context is reinstated from the study phase. This, how-
ever, seems unlikely given the ratios mentioned earlier and also the
presence of novel contexts which should generally alert partici-
pants to changes in contexts between encoding and retrieval. A
more likely possibility relates to an alternative approach to the role
of cue familiarity developed by Reder and her colleagues (Reder,
1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Reder & Schunn, 1996), by which
reliance on cue familiarity is not a deliberate strategy but a simple
and fast heuristic that needs not to be conscious. If people are
generally prone to automatically assume that greater familiarity of
a question is associated with better memory for an answer, then
they may not parse a global sense of familiarity as originating from
the focal (cue) and incidental (context) aspects of a retrieval
setting. In this scenario, context familiarity is effectively misat-
tributed to the question embedded in this context, giving rise to an
effect that is indistinguishable from the effect of increased famil-
iarity of the cue itself. Context familiarity effects for FOK judg-
ments would thus be similar to effects obtained in recognition
memory in which recognition probes presented in familiar context
seem more familiar themselves, an effect revealed by an increase
in both hits and false alarms in the presence of familiar contexts
(Hockley, 2008; Murnane & Phelps, 1993).
The second effect of context on FOK judgments was revealed
by looking at context reinstatement. Not only were FOK judg-
ments higher in the presence of familiar compared to unfamiliar
contexts, but they were still higher if these familiar contexts were
the same contexts that were present at encoding for given pairs.
Just as the effect of context familiarity on FOK judgments parallels
a similar effect observed for retrospective confidence judgments in
recognition decisions, so does the effect of context reinstatement
(Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Coote, 2014). In the recognition
studies, reinstating context facilitates retrieval of associations be-
tween a recognition target and its context and such retrievals
constitute evidence that a given recognition item was studied.
However, in the cued-recall test which was used in the present
study, there are two words associated with each context: a cue and
a target. Reinstating context can thus facilitate retrieval of an
association between a cue and its initial context, just as in recog-
nition studies. Alternatively (or additionally), it may facilitate
retrieval of a to-be-remembered target itself. This latter possibility
finds support from the cued-recall results that are discussed later.
For the present point it is crucial to note that access to the target
need not be complete and context reinstatement may also facilitate
access to partial information about the target, which is known to
affect FOK judgments (Koriat, 1993). Context reinstatement can
thus have two different memory effects in a cued-recall situation
and it is thus of interest which one is responsible for an increase in
FOK judgments observed in the present study. The pattern of
relative accuracy of FOK judgments is helpful in this regard.
Previous research by Thomas et al. (2011) has consistently shown
that partial retrieval of target information affects not only the
magnitude of FOK judgments but also their relative accuracy.
Specifically, retrieval of partial information is related to increased
accuracy of FOK judgments. However, in the present study we
failed to find any effects of context condition on the accuracy of
FOK judgments. This strongly suggests that context reinstatement
does not lead to retrieval of any information that would aid
predictions regarding the outcome of subsequent target recogni-
tion. We thus argue that what participants retrieve in the reinstated
context condition—and what is responsible for the elevated FOK
judgments—is not partial information about the target but rather
additional information about the cue, namely its association with
the local context.
The important insight from our context reinstatement manip-
ulation is thus that reinstating context at retrieval can facilitate
access to various elements of the encoding episode, affecting
metamemory assessments in turn. Recognition studies, on which the
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majority of recent work on context effects has concentrated (see
Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Masson, 2007; Hockley, 2008; Levy, Rabin-
yan, & Vakil, 2008; Macken, 2002; Reder et al., 2013; Tibon, Vakil,
Goldstein, & Levy, 2012), provide a very simplified scenario in which
only a single focal memory item (the recognition probe) is presented
and thus the role of context can only be determined as it applies to this
one item. In cued recall—for which studies to date considered only
the role of context in accessing to-be-remembered target (e.g., Smith
et al., 2014)—context reinstatement can affect both how effec-
tively the target is accessed but also how the cue is processed, as
revealed in our present study. In more complex tasks, just as in rich
environments outside laboratories, context effects may be more
complex still. Our recent investigation of context reinstatement
effects in an eyewitness scenario (Krogulska, Skóra, Scoboria,
Hanczakowski, & Zawadzka, 2016) revealed that context rein-
statement can reduce “do-not-know” responding for unanswerable
questions for which correct answer was never presented to partic-
ipants. Clearly, reinstating context could not facilitate retrieval of
any information related to a detail that was never presented.
However, reinstated context could facilitate retrieval to other as-
pects of stimuli rich in detail that are used in eyewitness settings,
and those additional retrievals could influence participants’
metamemory assessments made for unanswerable questions. These
context effects bear resemblance to noncriterial recollection effects
observed for FOK judgments (Brewer et al., 2010; Hertzog et al.,
2014; Schwartz et al., 2014) and extend them by demonstrating
that metamemory processes aimed at one element of an episode
need not only be affected by retrieval of information related to this
particular element but can indeed be affected by noncriterial re-
trieval of any element of the particular episode.
Our results indicate that metacognitive judgments are sensitive
to any type of memory information available at retrieval, whether
elicited by cue, target, or context. Importantly, this sensitivity is
not necessarily accompanied by changes in the accuracy or effi-
ciency with which subsequent actual memory responses are made.
The first aspect of this claim is generally in accordance with the
ideas outlined in the accessibility framework developed by Koriat
(1993; see also Koriat, 1995; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). In
Koriat’s (1993) words,
Whenever subjects interrogate their memory for a specific piece of
information, a variety of clues come to mind. These include activa-
tions from the terms in the question; structural, contextual, and se-
mantic attributes; fragments of the target; and so on . . . even when
retrieval fails, these very clues contain important information that can
be used in judging whether the target can be recalled or recognized in
the future. (p. 611)
However, what our results add to this observation is that when
people judge the probability of future memory success, they seem
to rely also on cues that do not contain any predictive information
whatsoever, be it familiarity of cue and context or retrieval of
information which is unrelated to retrieval of a target. As a result,
the factors influencing metamemory judgments are not necessarily
positively correlated with factors affecting successful recognition
of target information. Instead, we propose that people do not
actually evaluate the usefulness of any memory information that is
accessed, but rather follow a very simple accessibility heuristic by
which any type of memory information that they retrieve induces
them to predict better memory performance in the future. We also
note that the same occurs for postdictions of memory performance
since context familiarity affects retrospective confidence judg-
ments even when it has no impact on memory accuracy (Hanc-
zakowski, Zawadzka, & Coote, 2014). Recently, Starns, Pazzaglia,
Rotello, Hautus, and Macmillan (2013; see also Starns & Ksander,
2016) have shown that stronger memory for an item itself in-
creases participants’ confidence in source decisions concerning the
item, even though better memory that an item was presented
clearly does not help answering the question about, for example,
the voice in which it was presented. Together, all these results
show sensitivity of metacognitive monitoring to any type of mem-
ory information elicited while making a metacognitive judgment.
In the metacognitive framework of remembering it is always
assumed that metacognitive monitoring is important because it
feeds into control processes that eventually impact upon various
measures of memory performance. For example, the investigation
of retrospective confidence judgments is vital as confidence as-
sessments determine the likelihood that certain information will be
included in a memory report (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Koriat &
Goldsmith, 1996). FOK judgments are known to be related to at
least two forms of metacognitive control: the duration of a memory
search (Singer & Tiede, 2008) and the propensity to choose unre-
called items for restudy (Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Cockcroft-
McKay, 2014). Our variant of a “total accessibility” hypothesis
outlined above would suggest that eliciting any type of memory
information at retrieval (and possibly also at encoding) would be
reflected in changes in how metacognitive control is exerted. This
was clearly the case in our previous investigations of context
effects in recognition in which both context familiarity and context
reinstatement not only increased retrospective confidence judg-
ments but also translated into more responses volunteered in a
memory report. In the present study we looked at the latencies of
an unsuccessful memory search in various context conditions. We
found that context familiarity consistently affected metacognitive
control as participants were motivated to search their memory
longer in the presence of a familiar rather than novel context.
Surprisingly, context reinstatement did not have any additional
impact on metacognitive control beyond that already attributable
to context familiarity. Even a combined analysis of search laten-
cies for unsuccessful retrieval attempts in Experiments 1 and 2
with a 2 (context: reinstated vs. re-paired) & 2 (Experiment: 1 vs.
2) mixed ANOVA failed to reveal any effect of context reinstate-
ment, F(1, 92) ! 1.08, MSE ! 1.58, p ! .30, #p2 ! .01. It is not
clear at present why one form of metacognitive control is differ-
ently sensitive to two manipulations that have clearly similar
effects on metacognitive monitoring. This issue will require further
research but at present our findings clearly underscore the neces-
sity of combining examinations of metacognitive monitoring with
those of metacognitive control, as these constructs may be not
always be equally sensitive to various experimental manipulations.
The present study was concerned with effects of context on
metacognition but, as argued throughout this discussion, these are
closely interweaved with context effects on memory, to which we
now briefly turn. The paradigm we used in the present study was
originally developed to examine context effects in recognition
memory (Hockley, 2008; Macken, 2002; Murnane et al., 1999). In
these studies, it is usually found that varying context familiarity
exerts a similar effect on hit rates and false alarm rates, leaving
recognition discrimination unchanged. An additional effect of con-
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text reinstatement is sometimes found, such that recognition dis-
crimination is better in the presence of a reinstated rather than
re-paired context, but this effect seems to be weak and is most
often obtained when encoding instructions require participants to
associate items with their contexts (e.g., Gruppuso et al., 2007;
Hockley, 2008; Reder et al., 2013). The results of the present study
can be discussed in relation to the effects of context reinstatement
and context familiarity in cued recall. Regarding context reinstate-
ment, the conclusion seems to be rather clear as in both experi-
ments cued-recall performance was numerically highest in the
reinstated context condition (differing significantly from the novel
context condition in both Experiments 1 and 2), consistent with the
idea that context reinstatement facilitated retrieval of targets (see
also Smith et al., 2014). Interestingly, this occurred despite the fact
that in none of the experiments participants were asked to associate
word pairs with context photographs. These results confirm that
even incidentally encoded context may benefit memory perfor-
mance if reinstated at test.
The effects of context familiarity on cued recall in our experi-
ments are more difficult to explain. The problem lies in the fact
that these were inconsistent across experiments. In Experiment 1,
we unexpectedly obtained results suggesting that re-paired context
increased retrieval interference. Participants’ correct cued recall
was the poorest in the re-paired condition while rate of intrusions
was the highest. Subsequent recognition for unrecalled items re-
vealed the highest performance in the re-paired context condition,
consistent with the idea that some of targets that were encoded and
thus available in memory were nevertheless not accessed in a
cued-recall task due to interference from other targets cued by
re-paired contexts. This pattern of interference in cued recall on the
surface seems surprising, as none has been found in recognition
studies. On the other hand, investigations of important memory
phenomena that are present in recall but often absent from recog-
nition, such as list-strength effect (Ratcliff, Clark, & Shiffrin,
1990; Verde, 2009), list-length effect (Dennis, Lee, & Kinnell,
2008), or retrieval-induced forgetting (Verde & Perfect, 2011),
clearly suggest that interference effects play a more prominent role
in tests of recall than recognition. This picture is, however, further
clouded by the fact that all signatures of interference in the
re-paired context condition were absent in Experiment 2. The only
difference between these two experiments was the addition of a
preexposure phase in the procedure and the inclusion of items from
the prefamiliarized condition in the cued-recall test. Assuming that
these differences between our experiments are not caused by a
sampling error, it seems more likely that the change in the list
composition could have been responsible for these divergent re-
sults. In Experiment 1 two thirds of contexts used in the cued-
recall task were associated with one of the targets whereas in
Experiment 2 only half of contexts were associated with any
targets. Despite the fact that we did not ask our participants to
retrieve targets associated with contexts and only required retrieval
of targets associated with cues, it is possible that participants in
Experiment 1 actively tried to gather any possible information
during cued recall. By contrast, they could have been less moti-
vated toward such active retrieval in Experiment 2 with fewer
contexts associated with targets. Independently of whether this is
the actual reason for our results, which is very speculative at best,
it remains interesting that presenting re-paired context at retrieval
can at least sometimes result in interference and reduced perfor-
mance. The question whether such interference is automatic or
requires participants to actively engage in an extended memory
search should be the topic of further studies.
In conclusion, the results of the present study underscore the fact
that metacognitive processing is sensitive to environmental context
in which it takes place. The two context effects that have been
previously described in studies on basic memory processes, the
context familiarity effect and the context reinstatement effect, were
revealed to affect FOK judgments in the present study. These
findings demonstrate not only the need to broaden the investiga-
tions into the basis of metacognitive processing but also the
usefulness of merging the metacognitive and memory approach to
studying the process of remembering unfolding in various envi-
ronmental contexts.
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